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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PAM JOY REALTY, a California 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
5900 ASSOCIATES, L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company, and 
JOHN DOES 1-10, unknown 
individuals, 
Defendants and Appellee. 
Case No. 940662-CA 
Priority No. 15 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a summary judgment of the Third Judi-
cial District Court. Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court was made 
pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated, which grants 
appellate jurisdiction in connection with judgments over which 
the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction. There-
after the Supreme Court poured-over the case to the Court of 
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Appeals for disposition. Jurisdiction is not contested by the 
parties. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The precise issues for the court to review in this case are 
the following: 
1. Whether the parol evidence rule as a matter of law bars 
appellant from changing the terms of the parties unambiguous 
written contracts. 
2. Whether under the legal doctrine of "merger" the final 
intention of the parties was, as a matter of law, merged into the 
final written contracts of the parties. 
3. Whether there are undisputed material facts that would 
bar appellant's claim of intentional misrepresentation. 
4. Whether there are undisputed material facts that would 
bar appellant's claim of negligent misrepresentation. 
5. Whether the necessary elements exist in this case to 
reform the written agreements of the parties. 
Appellee agrees with appellant that all of the above repre-
sent issues of law to be reviewed by the Appellate Court under a 
correctness standard. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions or 
statutes. This appeal involves interpretation of the common 
law1. 
- 2 -
1
 §68-3-1, Utah Code Annotated adopts the common law as the 
rule of decision in all courts of this state. 
STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS 
The facts of this case are simple and uncomplicated. The 
controversy arises in connection with the sale of an office 
building in Murray, Utah. Plaintiff and appellant (Pam Joy) was 
the buyer. Defendant and appellee (5900 Associates) was the 
seller. The only issue in the litigation involves a claim for a 
roof warranty. Pam Joy claims that the seller orally represented 
that the building had been recently re-roofed, and agreed to 
provide buyer with a 5-year warranty from Layton Roofing Company 
(R-2, 74). The warranty was never provided, and Pam Joy thereup-
on filed this action and alleged some 8 causes of action in its 
complaint (R-2). 
After the filing of plaintiff's complaint, defendant moved 
for summary judgment alleging that there was no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that plaintiff could not as a matter of 
law prevail on any of its numerous theories (R-18). The trial 
court agreed, and after briefing and oral argument, granted the 
defendant's motion for summary judgment (R-102). 
The undisputed material facts upon which 5900 Associates 
relied, and continues to rely on appeal, are as follows: 
1. On June 30, 1993, Pam Joy purchased an office building 
from 5900 Associates in Murray, Utah for a purchase price of 
$1,420,000.00 (R-35). 
2. Addendum I attached hereto is a copy of the preliminary 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement covering the purchase and sale of 
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the building. 
3. Paragraph 6 of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement pro-
vides that the sale is to be made with "none" warranties except 
for the HVAC Mechanical System (see Addendum I). 
4. Addendum II attached hereto is a copy of the Closing 
Statement and final Contract between the parties. 
5. Paragraph 3 of the final Contract provides that buyer is 
purchasing the property in "as is" condition except for the 
repair items and warranties as stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
the contract (see Addendum II). 
6. Addendum III attached hereto is a copy of the Warranty 
Deed covering the sale of the property. 
7. Neither the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, the final 
contract, nor the Warranty Deed obligate the seller to provide 
any roof warranty (see Addendums I, II and III). 
8. Pam Joy has alleged by affidavit that seller's agent, 
Barlow Briggs, made various oral representations as claimed in 
appellant's brief. The thrust of the representations were that 
the building had recently been re-roofed by Layton Roofing 
Company and that the seller would provide buyer with a 5 year 
roof warranty from Layton Roofing Company (R-74). For purposes 
of summary judgment seller is required to acknowedge these 
allegations as being true. 
9. Briggs acknowledges that there were discussions about 
the roof. He states by affidavit that it was never his 
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intention, however, for the seller to become legally bound to do 
anything other than was provided in the written contract. Prior 
to the sale, Layton Roofing had made roof repairs to the build-
ing. Briggs thought he could get a warranty from Layton Roofing, 
and, as an accomodation to the buyer, tried to get it. Briggs 
was unsuccessful in getting a roof warranty from Layton Roofing 
(R-42). 
10. The roof of the building has not leaked, deteriorated, 
or otherwise failed since the sale in June of 1993, and is not in 
need of repair or replacement (R-43). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
5900 Associates arguments on appeal may be summarized as 
follows: 
1. The written agreements of the parties provide that the 
office building is purchased "as is". The written contracts also 
specifically negate any warranties, except those that are specif-
ically enumerated. The contracts are unambiguous and cannot be 
varied by parol evidence. 
2. Under the doctrine of merger, preliminary agreements, if 
any, are merged into the final written contract. 
3. Pam Joy's claim for intentional misrepresentation must 
fail because (a) there cannot as matter of law have been any 
reasonable reliance, (b) there was no misrepresentation of a 
presently existing fact, (c) an intent to deceive cannot as a 
matter of law be based upon inconclusive evidence, and (d) no 
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damages have been suffered by the buyer. The lack of any one of 
these elements would be fatal to Pam Joy's fraud claim. 
4. The elements to establish negligent mispresentation are 
essentially the same as the elements of fraud, except that the 
representation is made negligently rather than knowingly. Thus 
the negligence claim must fail by reason of the same missing 
elements as enumerated in paragraph 3 above. 
5. With respect to the reformation claim, the drafting of 
the final contract was essentially the same as the preliminary 
contract. There could be no showing of any mutual mistake in 
connection with the drafting of the final contract, and there was 
no prejudice to the buyer. 
6. Plaintiff cannot meet its burden to prove fraud or facts 
justifying reformation by clear and convincing evidence. 
7. The trial court properly granted defendant's motion for 
summary judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S CONTRACT CLAIMS ARE BARRED 
BY THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE 
The caption of Point I of Appellant's brief states that 
"Plaintiff's Fraud Claims are Not Barred by the Parol Evidence 
Rule or Merger". Appellee has never claimed otherwise. The 
parol evidence rule is a contract principle. Fraud is a tort 
principle. On appeal, appellant has created confusion by 
intermingling the two concepts. 
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Pam Joy's causes of action for Declaratory Judgment, 
Promissory Estoppel, Breach of Oral Contract, and Specific 
Performance all sound in contract, not tort. The trial court 
properly applied the parol evidence rule to grant summary judg-
ment on the contract claims. Such judgment was based upon the 
following undisputed facts: 
Paragraph 3 of the final contract (Addendum II) provides as 
follows: 
"Buyer accepts the building in an "as is" condition, except 
as provided in paragraphs (1) and (2) listed above". 
Paragraph (1) relates to repairs and requires the seller to 
make enumerated repairs to the parking area; remove discoloration 
from the bricks; replace broken bricks; and replace carpet in 
certain designated areas. The roof is not listed as one of the 
items to be repaired. 
Paragraph (2) specifically deals with the subject of warran-
ty and requires the seller to warrant the heating system, 
ventilating system, air conditioning system and elevator for a 
period of one year. The roof is not listed as an item to be 
warranted. 
The final contract as stated above is also in complete 
harmony with the written preliminary Earnest Money Sales Agree-
ment (Addendum I) which provides at paragraph 6 for warranty of 
the HVAC system2 and for "none" other warranties. Nor is the 
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2
 HVAC means heating, ventilating and air conditioning 
system. 
roof listed in paragraph 7 of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
as one of the items to be repaired. 
The terms "as is" in the final contract and "none" in the 
preliminary contract are not ambiguous. Any supplemental or 
separate contract as claimed by appellant would therefore vary 
the terms of the unambiguous written contracts. This strikes at 
the heart of the very thing that the parol evidence rule says 
cannot be done. 
Appellant has relied upon and quoted extensively from the 
Arizona case of Formento v. Encanto Business Park, 744 P.2d 22 
(Ariz. App. 1987). Appellee has no quarrel at all with the 
Formento holding. Under Formento the seller of a lot fraudulent-
ly concealed the fact that the subject lot had height restric-
tions under circumstances where all of the parties were aware 
that the buyer was purchasing the lot for the purpose of building 
a two story building. The court held that the seller could not 
hide behind the parol evidence rule to escape claims of inten-
tional or negligent misrepresentation. The court also applied a 
tort analysis properly holding that the parol evidence rule was 
no defense to a misrepresentation claim. The difference between 
Formento and the instant case is that here the court did in fact 
make a tort analysis and found certain elements of fraud to be 
missing. Having done so, there would likewise be no fraud to 
consider in a contract analysis. 
In this appeal it is not particularly significant whether 
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fraud is an exception to the parol evidence rule. Pam Joy made a 
specific tort claim based upon fraud. Appellee has never claimed 
that extrinsic or parol evidence cannot be used to prove fraud. 
The trial court found based upon plaintiff's parol affidavit 
evidence that as a matter of law fraud, or intentional misrep-
resentation, did not exist. If there is no fraud, then 
appellant's argument with respect to a fraud exception to the 
contract claim is moot3. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF'S CONTRACT CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF MERGER 
A separate legal basis for the denial of plaintiff's claims 
is the doctrine of merger. This concept establishes the 
completeness of the final contracts and deed by extinguishing all 
antecedent agreements, whether written or oral. It is said that 
the purpose of the merger doctrine is to preserve the integrity 
of the final documents of conveyance and encourage the diligence 
of the parties. Embassy Group vs. Hatch, 865 P.2d 1366 (Utah 
1993). Indeed it has been stated: 
"Ordinarily, a final contract does represent the final 
meeting of the minds, and in it are merged all the 
terms expressing the final intention of the parties 
and any augmentations. If there are inconsistencies 
between the terms of the preliminary and final contracts, 
those of the latter will ordinarily govern". 
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3
 See Point III of this brief for arguments and authorities 
upholding the trial court's summary determination of no 
fraud. 
Mawhinney vs. Jensen, 120 Utah 142, 232 P.2d 769 (1951). 
It is possible that many things were discussed during the 
negotiations between the parties. Such is usually the case in 
all real estate transactions. But a final contract eventually 
emerged that was clear and unambiguous. Based upon the final 
contract, a warranty deed was given to the buyer. The doctrine 
of merger would now recognize the final contract to be just that 
— a final contract. 
Appellee does not claim that the merger doctrine would bar a 
claim for fraud. What is claimed is that the court has deter-
mined as a matter of law that the necessary elements of fraud do 
not exist in this case. So again (as was shown under Point I) if 
there was no fraud the fraud issue becomes unimportant with 
respect to any contract claim. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT ESTABLISH FRAUD AS A MATTER OF LAW 
In the trial court the plaintiff argued both contract and 
tort theories. On appeal, however, the contract claims seem to 
have been abandoned (except for the reformation claim) and the 
emphasis has shifted to the claims of intentional misrepresenta-
tion (otherwise known as fraud) and negligent misrepresentation. 
Thus, the fraud analysis becomes the most important part of the 
appeal. 
Under Utah law, the well established elements of fraud are: 
(1) A representation. 
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(2) Of a presently existing fact. 
(3) Which was false. 
(4) Which the representor knew to be false. 
(5) For the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon 
it. 
(6) And the other party acted reasonably. 
(7) And did in fact rely upon it. 
(8) And was thereby induced to act. 
(9) And was damaged. 
See Andalex Resources v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041 (Utah App. 
1994; Conder v. A.L. Williams & Associates, 739 P.2d 634 (Utah 
App. 1987); Copper State Leasing v. Blacker Appliance, 770 P.2d 
88 (Utah App. 1958). 
It is the position of the appellee that elements (2), (4), 
(6) and (9) are missing in this case as a matter of law. The 
absence of any one of these elements would be fatal to the 
appeal. 
A. Absence of Representation of a Presently Existing Fact. 
The misrepresentation claimed in this case is that the seller's 
agent, Barlow Brigs, orally represented that the buyer would be 
provided with a 5 year roof warranty from Layton Roofing Company. 
Plaintiff also claims that Briggs represented that the building 
had been recently re-roofed. 
With respect to providing the roof warranty this clearly, 
obviously and on its face is not a representation of a presently 
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existing fact. At best it is a representation of something to be 
performed in the future. Utah case authority clearly holds that 
misrepresentation of intended future performance is not a "pres-
ently existing fact" upon which a claim for fraud can be based. 
Republic Group v. Won-Door Corp., 247 U.A.R. 31 (Sept. 1994); 
Andalex Resources v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041 (Utah App. 1994). 
A review of plaintiff's trial brief (R-53) and of 
plaintiff's oral argument (R-135-142) indicates that it was the 
failure to get a roof waranty that was the big item of concern. 
The alleged representation as to the building having been 
recently re-roofed was hardly even mentioned. However, on 
appeal, it is now this latter fact (which is all they have) that 
is being clinged to in a last minute effort to try to save the 
case. 
With respect to the re-roofing, Barlow Briggs on behalf of 
the seller, submitted his sworn affidvit stating that he had 
personally managed the property, and was familiar with the 
condition of the roof and that prior to the sale Layton Roofing 
Company "had made extensive roof repairs to the building" and 
that the roof was in good condition (R-42,43). 
Buyer's opposing affidvit, submitted by Alan Smalley, does 
not claim any problem with the roof, or that the roof is not in 
good condition, or that it needs any repair, but merely alleges 
that Briggs told him that sellers had re-roofed the entire 
building. He then states in his affidavit at paragraph 14 (R-77) 
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the following: 
"Pam Joy recently discovered that Layton Roofing did 
not re-roof the entire roof of the building, but rather 
made only certain limited repairs thereto". 
It is appellee's position that the above is without founda-
tion of any kind, is based upon hearsay (alleges recent discovery 
with no indication of personal knowledge), is conclusory, and is 
vague (in that the term "limited repairs", without further 
explanation is meaningless). This affidavit sentence upon which 
the appellant must rely can hardly meet the requirements of Rule 
56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which, according to the case 
law, requires that affidavits used in determining summary judg-
ments must set forth facts as would be admissible in evidence, 
Preston v. Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P.2d 1021 (1968); must not 
be conclusory, Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983); and 
must be based upon personal knowledge and not unsubstantiated 
beliefs, Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985). But 
even if the affidavit is to be considered it is plaintiff's 
position that the difference between "extensive repairs" 
(plaintiff's version) and "re-roofing of the entire building" 
(defendant's version) is insignificant under circumstances where 
no claim is made as to any repair needs or defect to the roof. 
In summary under this sub-heading plaintiff claims that the 
real alleged misrepresentations do not involve presently existing 
facts; that the only misrepresentation that could conceivably be 
of a presently existing fact is lacking in significance and 
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materiality; and that in any event plaintiff's opposing affidavit 
is so lacking in evidenciary substance that it cannot be 
considered. 
B. Absence of an Intent to Decieve. The recent case of 
Andalex Resources v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1994) holds that, 
even at the summary judgment stage, that there must be sufficient 
evidence to support each and every element of a fraud case by 
clear and convincing evidence. The court further held that an 
intent to deceive cannot be inferred by doubtful, vague, specula-
tive or inconclusive evidence. Thus in Andalex where promises 
for the payment of future compensation were allegedly made with a 
fraudulent intent at the time made, this court affirmed the 
dismissal of the fraud claim for lack of any real evidence that 
would demonstrate such a fraudulent intent. 
In the instant case, Briggs has sworn that extensive repairs 
had been made to the roof; that he thought he could get a warran-
ty from the roofer and tried to get one as an accomodation to the 
buyer; but that it was never his intention that such be part of 
the sales contract. And it was in fact excluded from the sales 
contract. 
Plaintiff alleges that it was told by Briggs that the 
building had been re-roofed, but, as pointed out under Point III-
B, appellee views this difference to be negligable. Plaintiff 
now claims that the repairs were "limited" but gives no 
explanation as to what that means. There is no claim that Briggs 
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concealed any condition of the roof, and in fact there is not 
even a claim that any defective condition exists. 
Bottom line is that plaintiff has offered nothing of 
substance that could possibly meet the burden of establishing an 
intent to deceive by clear and convincing evidence. That being 
so, then, according to Andalex the summary judgment and dismissal 
of the fraud claim must be affirmed. 
C. Absence of Reasonable Reliance. The absence of reasona-
ble reliance is an exceptionally strong point for appellee, and 
is supported by recent authority from the Court of Appeals that 
is precisely in point. 
The authority upon which appellee relies is Maack v. Re-
source Design and Construction Inc., 875 P.2d 570 (Utah App. 
1994). That case involved the sale of a newly constructed house. 
Seller orally represented to buyer that there was a one year 
builders warranty that would go with the house. But the written 
contract provided that the house was being3purchased "as is". It 
turned out that there were a number of construction defects and 
the builder refused to recognize any warranty extending to the 
new purchaser. So, (as was done exactly in the instant case) 
suit was filed against the seller alleging negligent misrepresen-
tation and fraud. 
A motion for summary judgment was filed by the seller and 
granted by the trial court. In affirming the summary judgment 
the Court of Appeals held that the "as is" clause in the written 
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contract negated the element of reasonable reliance. In other 
words, the court held that by agreeing to purchase "as is" and by 
not requiring any reference to the warranty in the written 
agreement, and by never having looked at or reviewed the builders 
warranty prior to the sale, that the buyer could not — as a 
matter of law — have reasonably relied upon the oral representa-
tion. 
Appellant has made a feeble attempt in its brief to 
distinguish Maack from the facts here. However, appellee would 
submit that the facts in the instant case are stronger, not 
weaker, in establishing an absence of reasonable reliance. Those 
facts are: 
1. This sale involved a building costing $1,420,000.00. 
Buyer is a Realty Company from Beverly Hills California. It is 
fair to assume that the buyer had some degree of sophistication, 
and there is no claim to the contrary. 
2. Here the buyer signed not only one, but two separate 
written contracts negating the extistence of warranties. The 
preliminary Earnest Money Agreement dated May 21, 1993 provided 
for "none" warranties, and the final contract of June 30, 1993 
provided for the purchase "as is". The existence of two consist-
ent contracts, separated by a period of more than two months 
certainly weakens any claim of reasonable reliance upon claimed 
representations that are totally inconsistent. 
3. In this case the buyer required the seller to 
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specifically warrant certain items — namely the heating system, 
ventilating system, air conditioning system and elevator. This 
is not a case where the subject of warranty was overlooked in 
preparing contracts. The existence of specific warranties, 
together with the contractual recitations that there are no other 
warranties, makes appellant's position very hard to buy. 
4. Although Alan Smalley claims that he asked for the roof 
warranty the hard undisputed fact remains that he never got it, 
never saw it, never examined it, and never knew for sure what was 
in it. Yet appellant went ahead with two separate contracts 
agreeing to purchase the property "as is". 
5. Appellant states by affidavit (R-75,76, paragraphs 5 and 
8) that the representations by Briggs took place prior to the 
sale, which would have been approximately May 21, 1993 (alleged 
letters having been dated in April 1993). Buyer therefore signed 
the Earnest Money Agreement knowing that no roof warranty had 
ever been furnished. After not getting it the first time, buyer 
had a second opportunity to get it before executing documents if 
it was something of any importance. Obviously it wasn't. 
6. Expanding on paragraph 5 above, it might also be argued 
that once having relied upon a representation and being disap-
pointed in not getting what was allegedly promised, that a 
sophisticated buyer cannot reasonably continue to extend the same 
reliance, and blissfully go about signing written contracts which 
are directly contradictory. There comes a point where a party 
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must be held to its written contracts. 
7. The opportunity to inspect the roof prior to sale; the 
condition of the roof; the fact that no roof failure was 
anticipated; and the fact that the roof is still in good 
condition give further perspective to the insignificance of the 
warranty issue and the lack of reliance on the part of the buyer. 
This case cannot be distinguished from Maack, and if any-
thing, is a stronger case supporting lack of reliance. It would 
be impossible in this case for plaintiff to meet its burden of 
showing by clear and convincing evidence that it was reasonable 
to rely upon oral statements that contradicted the terms of two 
written contracts. 
D. Absence of Damages. One of the elements of every tort 
case, including fraud, is the element of damages. Conder v. A.L. 
Williams & Associates, 739 P.2d 634 (Utah App. 1987). 
It is undisputed in this case that the roof is in good 
condition, does not leak, and is not in need of repair or 
replacement. Plaintiff has never claimed any roof failure, or 
that it leaks, or that it is in need of repair, or that there is 
any real jeopardy that it will not last at least 5 years from the 
date of sale (R-43). 
In light of the above undisputed facts, defendant argued, 
and the trial court so found, that no damages were suffered. 
Appellant now argues that even though there has been no roof 
failure it is entitled to the cost of a warranty, which, accord-
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ing to its unfoundationed hearsay affidavit, is $19,000.00. 
Appellee finds a number of problems with this argument, even 
assuming that the affidavit would be considered. 
The first problem with appellant's argument is that if the 
court finds any misrepresentation at all, it would have to be the 
alleged representation that the building had been entirely re-
roofed. The claimed representation of providing a warranty 
cannot possibly qualify as a representation of a presently 
existing fact, so the arbitory cost of whatever Layton Roofing 
might charge for a roof warranty would have no materiality in a 
fraud context. In other words, if the promise to provide a 
warranty in the future isn't fraud, then the cost of a warranty 
couldn't be a measure of damage. Damage would have to flow from 
the representations that constitute fraud. And if the condition 
of the roof was somehow misrepresented, no damages could exist 
absent a showing that there is something wrong with the roof. 
But, for the sake of argument, if the appellee were to 
concede every other point to the appellant, and were to assume an 
obligation existed to provide a warranty, still there could be no 
damage in this case. Appellee likens this case to the simple 
principle under agency law that imposes personal liability upon 
an agent who makes a promise for a principal without authority. 
The very same principle applies here. If as a part of the 
contract the seller promised to provide a roofing warranty from 
Layton Roofing Company, and if there is an obligation to provide 
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the warranty, and if the seller cannot deliver, then the seller 
becomes obligated on the warranty and would be liable for whatev-
er isn't delivered. Under this scenario, the seller now steps 
into the shoes of Layton Roofing and becomes the warrantor. 
Buyer has its warranty, except that it now looks to the seller 
rather than to Layton. But until the roof fails, buyer has no 
more of a claim against the seller than it would have had against 
Layton Roofing. 
The above analysis also fits in with the concept of mitiga-
tion. Layton Roofing Company isn't free to establish some damage 
figure out of the sky by charging whatever it wants for a warran-
ty. The buyer would be required to mitigate by taking its 
warranty from someone else — which in this case would be the 
seller. 
The above of course assumes that the seller has an obliga-
tion to provide a warranty in the first place, which it doesn't. 
But in any event there can be no scenario of damages, and absent 
damages, there can be no claim. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT ESTABLISH NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION 
AS A MATTER OF LAW 
The elements to establish negligent misrepresentation are 
basically the same as the elements of fraud, except that the 
representation is made negligently rather than knowingly. 
Mostrong v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573 (Utah App. 1993). 
The above being so, the arguments under Point III of this 
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brief apply equally to plaintiff's claim of negligent misrepre-
sentation. Specifically, the absence of a representation of a 
presently existing fact, the absence of reasonable reliance, or 
the absence of damages would preclude any claim for negligent 
misrepresentation. 
POINT V 
THERE IS NO LEGAL OR FACTUAL BASIS TO JUSTIFY A 
REFORMATION OF THE CONTRACT 
Plaintiff, as an alternative remedy, seeks to reform the 
written contract by adding provisions that would require the 
seller to provide a roof warranty. Reformation, however, is not 
a remedy that is appropriate for this case. 
In approaching a reformation analysis the following basic 
legal concepts must be applied: 
1. Reformation is a remedy the courts are reluctant to 
apply. It is exercised sparingly and with utmost caution. 66 
Am. Jur. 2d, Reformation of Instruments, §3; Briags vs. Liddell, 
699 P.2d 770 (Utah 1985). It is often said that "Reformation is 
a remedy not easily won". National Union Fire Ins. Co. vs. D&L 
Construction Company, 353 F.2d 169. 
2. The facts upon which reformation is based must be plead 
with particularity. Briggs vs. Liddell, supra; Rule 9(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3. The mutual mistake (or other basis for reformation) must 
be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Briaas vs. Lidell, 
supra; Bown vs. Loveland, 678 P.2d 292 (Utah 1984). For a matter 
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to be clear and convincing a mind "must at least have reached the 
point where there remains no serious or substantial doubt as to 
the correctness of the conclusion". Greener vs. Greener, 116 
Utah 571, 212 P.2d 194 (1949); M.U.J.I. 2.19. 
4. Unless there is fraud or inequitable conduct, 
if reformation is based upon a mistake, it must be a mutual 
mistake and not a unilateral mistake. "The mistake of only one 
party to an instrument, as occurred here, will not afford relief 
by reformation". Briggs vs. Liddell, supra; see also, Bown vs. 
Loveland, supra. 
5. Inasmuch as the relief sought by reformation is to make 
the agreement conform to the real intention of the parties, there 
must be a preliminary or antecedent agreement furnishing the 
basis for the rectification. The mistake must then be in the 
drafting of the instrument, not in the making of the contract. 
66 Am. Jur. 2d, Reformation of Instruments, §§ 4, 13. 
6. A mistake to justify reformation must be material, or 
something that substantially affects the rights and obligations 
of the parties. There must also be a showing of prejudice to the 
complaining party. 66 Am. Jur. 2d, Reformation of Instruments, 
§14. 
In the perspective of the above concepts, what are the facts 
of the instant case? 
Antecedent Agreement and Mutual Mistake. In looking at the 
final written contract of June 30, 1993 with its "as is" and 
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limitation of warranty provisions, we find the existence of an 
antecedent contract of May 21, 1993 — namely the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement. The antecedent agreement, however, is perfectly 
consistent with the final contract and refutes by its very terms 
what plaintiff now seeks to change by reformation. So plaintiff 
is now faced with the rather serious problem of having to reform 
not one, but two unambiguous written contracts. There has never 
been a claim that plaintiff did not read or did not understand 
either of the written contracts. No one is laboring under any 
dispute about the contract terms. There is no ignorance of any 
facts; plaintiff knew that it didn't have a roof warranty when 
its agent signed the written agreements, and knew that the 
agreements did not provide for a roof warranty. No claim has 
been made that the draftsman of either written contracts made any 
mistake or omitted something that he was told to put in. 
In reality plaintiff's claim doesn't go to a mutual mistake 
at all. At best it is a claim on an entirely separate oral 
contract frought with its own parol evidence, lack of 
consideration, merger and other legal problems. But it just 
doesn't fit into the category of reformation. And on top of all 
this is Briggs' affirmative affidavit that it was never his 
intention to become bound to anything other than what was provid-
ed in the written contract, and that his unsuccesful attempt to 
get a roof warranty was nothing more than an accomodation to the 
buyer. While it is true that Briggs' affidavit isn't per se 
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binding on the court and could be overcome by conflicting evi-
dence, there is simply no evidence in this case to do so or to 
overcome plaintiff's heavy burden which must be met by clear and 
convining evidence. 
Materiality and Prejudice. Plaintiff claims the cost of a 
roof warranty from Layton Roofing Company would be $19,000. This 
is not a proper measure of damage4, but even if it were, it 
represents only slightly more than 1% of the purchase price of 
the building. The materiality therefor becomes highly question-
able. At least we know that the buyer did not consider it 
material enough to include in either of the two written con-
tracts. 
And as to the element of prejudice, there is no claim that 
there is even anything wrong with the roof.5 No prejudice is 
therefore shown. 
This lawsuit is comparatively so trivial that it just cannot 
rise to the level where such a limited and unfavorable remedy of 
reformation would be proper. 
Clear and Convincing Evidence. Plaintiff has attempted to 
brush away its clear and convincing evidence problem by simply 
stating that it has raised an issue of fact. But in doing so, 
plaintiff misses the point. This is not a case of which party 
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4
 See argument at Point III D of this brief. 
5
 This is an undisputed fact (R-43). Also see argument at 
Point III D of this brief. 
can be the most persuasive in convincing a fact finder whether a 
mistake was or was not made. It is a case of meeting one's 
burden of proof. It is a case of whether plaintiff — as a 
matter of law — can establish that its case is so clear that 
there could be no substantial doubt. It is defendant's position, 
in light of the affirmative affidavit of Briggs; the existence of 
two written contracts; the clear and unambiguous language of the 
contracts; the second opportunity of plaintiff to correct any 
mistake; the lack of materiality and/or prejudice; and the 
vagueness, as well as the hearsay nature of plaintiff's opposing 
affidavit, that reasonable minds could simply never conclude that 
plaintiff's position is so clear and convincing that it is 
without doubt as to its correctness. 
This case is not different in principle from Neeley vs. 
Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979 (Utah 1979). In Neeley the trial court, 
after hearing the evidence of the parties, found that the parties 
were entitled to reform a deed. The case, however, was reversed 
on appeal, even though the parties testified that they were to 
receive certain land, on the ground that the mistake was not 
clear. The burden to show mistake by clear and convincing evi-
dence had not been met. 
Plaintiff, of course, is entitled to all of the usual 
presumptions of a losing party under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure (Summary Judgment). But given those presumptions in 
light of the facts here it would be impossible to establish by 
- 25 -
clear and convincing evidence that the elements for a reformation 
could be met, 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments and authorities as outlined in this 
brief, appellee, 5900 Associates, L.C., respectfully urges that 
the summary judgment granted by the trial court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST 
By S/^UZMJL 
David E. West 
1300 Walker Center 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellees 
5900 Associates, L.C. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
Seller: 5900 Associates, L.C., a Utah limited liability 
compaay 
Buyer: RPM Investments, Inc., a California corporation 
Property: 201 East 5900 South, Murray, Utah, 84107 
Closing Date: June 30, 1993 
1. Purchase Price $1,420,000.00 
2. Assignment of Seller's escrow account 8,650.31 
3. Pre-paid insurance 1,427.00 
4. Pre-paid utility deposits (Murray City) 1,098.00 
5. $1,431,175.31 
Less: 
6. Trust Deed Balance $896,000.00 
7. Seller's pro-rata share of 
1993 property taxes 7,440.75 
8. Pre-paid security deposits 7,200.00 
910,640.75 
9- Seller's Equity $520,534.56 
Charges to Seller at Closing 
10. 1/2 of loan assumption fee $ 4,480.00 
11. 1/2 of title insurance premium 1,183.50 
12. 1/2 of closing fees to Armstrong, Rawlings 
& West 500.00 
13. Real estate commission 50,000.00 
14. Recording of documents 25.00 
15. Escrow for improvements 30,000.00 
EXHIBIT ' B " 
16. 1/2 of escrow fee 250.00 
17# $86,438.50 
Charges to Buyer at Closing 
18. 1/2 of loan assumption fee $ 4,480.00 
19. 1/2 of title insurance premium 1,183.50 
20. 1/2 of closing fees to Armstrong, Rawlings 
& West 500.00 
21. Recording of documents 25.00 
22. 1/2 of escrow fee 250.00 
23. $ 6,438.50 
AMOUNT DUE FROM BUYER TO^CLOSE 
(Line 9 plus line 23]f $526^973.06 
AMOUNT PAYABLE TO SELLER AT CLOSING 
(Line 9 less line 17) $434,096.06 
Supplemental Contract Provisions 
Seller and buyer each agree to the following: 
1. Seller agrees to make the following repairs to the 
property: 
a) Repairing the parking lot area, by resurfacing and 
sealing against present leaking condition. Seller will provide 
Buyer with Contractors guarantee that this work has been complet-
ed and warranted against future water leakage for at least one 
year. 
b) Remove all discoloration from brick areas. 
c) Replace and repair all broken brick in walls and build-
ing. 
d) Replace carpet on second floor common area hallway. 
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e) Seller shall deposit into escrow with Armstrong, 
Rawlings & West acting as fiduciary afld escrow agent, the sum of 
$30,000 to guaranty completion of these improvements • These 
escrowed JEiinds-shall be returned to sailer when these improve-
ments haveab&en completed and. a release has been signed by the 
Buyer* 
2. Seller shall warrant the Heating, Ventilating and Air 
Conditioning^systems including all mechanical mechanisms involved 
with these systems, and the Elevator, against breakdown for a 
period ,oj^ gvne^ year. Warranty shall not include routine mainte-
nance, ^ ^^^^pconditional upon Buyer having a Contractual 
AgreementBo.^ a contractor to have these systems serviced on a 
quarterly *basis. 
3^ ^og^^accepts thefbuilding in an t!as is* condition, 
except as^l^xded in paragraphs (1) and (2) listed above. 
4. Buyfer agrees to assume all obligations under Seller's 
existing note and trust deed with St. Paul Federal Bank for 
Savings. Seller represents that the balance due is $896,000.00. 
5. ^^^^^o shall pay all interest on the existing note and 
trust dee^^^^xine 30, 1993* 
6. . Seller acknowledges receipt of a Guaranty Agreement 
dated Marchf^ly 1992 wherein Barlow Briggs, Max D. Scheel, Bert 
N. Smith, ^ Blaine R. Hale and Kent Howard have personally guaran-
teed an amount up to 10% of any principal default on the existing 
note and jtrust deed to St. Paul Federal Bank for Savings. Buyer 
shall indemnify and hold the guarantors harmless from any liabil-
ity under the Guarantee Agreement; and in addition, and as a 
condition of this sale, shall deliver to seller and guarantors at 
closing an ^agreement in writing wherein Alan Smalley of Beverly 
Hills, Califoiiiia, personally agrees to indemnify and hold 
guarantors^armless from any future liability under the Guaranty 
Agreement• 
7. Seller herewith delivers to Buyer all existing leases on 
the premises, and assigns to Buyer all of its interest in and to 
said leases. 
8. All;taxes, insurance and rents shall be pro-rated as of 
date of closing. Existing insurance shall be assigned to Buyer. 
9. Any^efaulting party to this agreement shall pay all of 
the costs ana, expenses of enforcing the same, including reason-
able attorney's fees incurred for enforcement or in connection 
with any breach. 
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10. Seller and Buyer recognize that Dr. Payne , in Suite 
#206, has not as of this time signed a new lease or an extension 
to his old lease. Seller hereby agrees to have this suite leased 
and will pay the leasing commission to a licensed real estate 
agent or broker to have this accomplished. Buyer agrees that if 
the Seller is able to lease this space through his own effort
 Tand 
ability, then the paying of any commission for leasing will be 
excused. If, however, Seller is unable to or that this suite is 
not leased within sixty (60) days from the lease7expiration, a 
licensed real estate broker or agent will be commissioned to do 
the leasing. The Buyer will approve the selection of the real 
estate broker to market this property. Seller^s obligation ±p^, 
pay a commission shall be limited to the commission apportionia&Le 
to the first three years of the lease. 
11-
Primary 
the event this lease is not renewed, Seller guarantees p a y m i n t ^ 
rent for a period of one year. Buyer shall make diligent efforts 
to release this space so as to mitigate Sellers obligation. The 
obligation under this paragraph shall be secured by a cash 
deposit, or a letter of credit from a reputable bank, in the 
amount of $55,000.00, which shall be deposited with Armstrong^ 
Rawlings & West as fiduciary and escrows agent* 
12. Buyer will give Briggs Realty^anexclusive listingj^o 
lease the space now occupied by Dr. Bradley, if Dr. Bradley *~~"~ 
elects to vacate his preent suite at the expiration of his 
present lease contract. Briggs Realty will receive a five 
percent (5%) commission if an acceptable tenant is found. This 
exclusive listing will be valid for sixty (60) days from the 
signing of this listing. 
DATED this 3> O day of L 1993. 
5900 ASSOCIATES, L.C. 
^ Its Mana a g e r C ^ 
SELLER 
RPM INVESTMENTS, INC. 
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The undersigned hereby acknowledges receipt of a copy of 
this agreement and agrees to act as an escrow agent in accordance 
with paragraphs 1 and 11 herein. 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST 
CLQ%.UX/ 
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WARRANTY DEED 
\ 
5900 Associates, L.C., a Utah limited liability company, 
with its principal office at Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, Grantor, hereby coveys and warrants to Pam Joy 
Realty, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of 
the State of California, with its principal office at Beverly 
Hills, Los Angeles County, State of California, Grantee, for the 
sum of TEN ($10.00) DOLLARS and other valuable consideration, the 
following described tract; of land in Salt Lake County, State of 
i* Utah: 
BEGINNING at a point on the North Right of Way Line of 
5900 South Street South 1162.23 feet and West 911.28 
feet from the calculated center of Section 18, Township 
2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, City 
of Murray, Utah; thence North 8*53'30fl East 150.00 feet; 
thence South 81*06'30" East 180.62 feet; thence South 
8«53'30P,|#est 150.00 feet to said Right .of^Way; thence North 
81#06 >3P^West 180.62 feet along the Right:' of Way to the' 
point of ^ BEGINNING. 
IN WITNESS'-WHEREOF the undersigned has executed and deliv-
ered this Deed on the Z-Pj day of June, 1993. 
5900 ASSOCIATES, L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company 
By. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Its Manager 
ss. 
On the 2~*j day of June, 1993, personally appeared before me 
Barlow Briggs, who being by me duly sworn did say that he is the 
Manger of 5900 Associates, L.C., a Utah limited liability compa-
ny, that said instrument was signed on behalf of said limited 
liability company and said Barlow Briggs acknowledged to me that 
said company executed the same. 
My Comission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLKT""! 
BARBARA B. HALL ' 
Armstrong Rawlings & West I 
^ 1300 Walker Center I 
Salt 1 akp Titi/ I I # 9 » I < M I « 4 • 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake City, UT 
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